Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not? by Hyde, Dominic & Colyvan, Mark
Paraconsistent Vagueness: Why Not?
D H
U  Q
d.hyde@uq.edu.au
M C
U  S
mcolyvan@usyd.edu.au
Received by Greg Restall
Published November 26, 2008
http://www.philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2008
© 2008 Dominic Hyde and Mark Colyvan
The idea that the phenomenon of vagueness might be modelled by a para-
consistent logic has been little discussed in contemporary work on vagueness,
just as the idea that paraconsistent logics might be fruitfully applied to the
phenomenon of vagueness has been little discussed in contemporary work on
paraconsistency. This is prima facie surprising given that the earliest formalisa-
tions of paraconsistent logics presented in Jas´kowski (1948) and Halldén (1949)
were presented as logics of vagueness.
One possible explanation for this is that, despite initial advocacy by pio-
neers of paraconsistency, the prospects for a paraconsistent account of vague-
ness are so poor as to warrant little further consideration. In this paper we look
at the reasons that might be offered in defence of this negative claim. As we
shall show, they are far from compelling. Paraconsistent accounts of vagueness
deserve further attention.
1    ?
What is a paraconsistent account of vagueness? In short, it takes up the idea
that where vagueness gives rise to indeterminacy, e.g. indeterminacy in the ap-
plication of predicate to a borderline case, this is to be modelled as a species
of overdetermination of truth as opposed to the more common supposition of
underdetermination of truth. In this way, then, where a is a borderline case of
redness we shall say that the sentence ‘a is red’ is true and so too its negation
‘a is not red’. Thus, where A is false if and only if its negation ¬A is true,
the atomic sentence ‘a is red’ is both true and false, giving rise to truth-value
gluts. This contrasts with the more commonly accepted semantic approach to
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vagueness according to which such a sentence is neither true nor false, giving
rise to truth-value gaps.
Moreover, despite some sentences and their negations being true, such an
approach should deny that every sentence is true (on pain of triviality). Where
validity is defined as preservation of truth then, the non-trivial account of
vagueness as overdetermination should reject the validity of the inference from
the truth of A and its negation ¬A to the truth of an arbitrary sentence B. The
inference, known as explosion, is classically valid, of course, and encodes the
trivialising effect of contradictory sentences on any theory to which they are
jointly admitted. Paraconsistent logics, on the other hand, are non-explosive
by definition. An account of vagueness as overdetermination thus should be
paraconsistent.
In fact, not only is such an account of vagueness paraconsistent in its pur-
suit of an inconsistent but non-trivial theory of vagueness, it is dialethic since
it proposes not simply that there can be contradictory sentences that are true
without everything being true, but more strongly that there are true contra-
dictory sentences. Such an account therefore will constitute a dialethic para-
consistent account of vagueness.1 (For more on this distinction see Beall 2004:
6.)
Beyond this central feature, paraconsistent accounts of vagueness vary in
much the same way as do their non-trivial truth-value gap counterparts—i.e.
paracomplete counterparts (which admit some contradictory pairs of sentences
as non-true while denying that every sentence is non-true).
More exactly, some paracomplete accounts go on to retain the necessary
truth of excluded middle claims (A ∨ ¬A) and other classical laws in the face
of truth-value gaps (e.g. supervaluationist accounts) with a resulting loss in
truth-functionality and consequent non-standard analyses of disjunction and
associated logical constants like the existential quantifier. Analogously, some
paraconsistent approaches to vagueness might go on to retain the necessary
non-truth of contradictions (A&¬A) and other classical laws in the face of
truth-value gluts with a resulting loss of truth-functionality and consequent
non-standard analyses of conjunction and associated logical constants like the
universal quantifier. For example, the discussive logic of Jas´kowski (1948) or
what has also become known as subvaluationism, the dual of supervaluation-
ism (on which see Hyde 1997), are of this kind.
Other paracomplete accounts retain the standard semantics for disjunc-
tion according to which a disjunction is true if and only if one of its disjuncts
is true and consequently reject the necessary truth of some excluded middle
claims in the face of truth-value gaps. The logic of Tye (1990) exemplifies such
1One could, of course, defend the use of a paraconsistent logic in giving an account of the
logic of vagueness as a mere mathematical tool, foregoing the stronger dialethic interpretation. I
set this aside in favour of the more obvious reading whereby “truth-value gluts” are construed as
real gluts, just as paracomplete “truth-value gap” approaches are generally understood as propos-
ing real gaps, not just invoking gaps as a technical tool.
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a truth-functional gap approach, employing Kleene’s “strong” three-valued sys-
tem K3. Other similar paracomplete alternatives include Łukasiewicz’s three-
valued system L3 with its alternative semantics for the conditional. Analo-
gously, some paraconsistent accounts might retain the standard semantics for
conjunction according to which a conjunction is true if and only if both con-
juncts are true and consequently reject the necessary non-truth of some contra-
dictions (and hence accept their truth) in the face of truth-value gluts. Priest’s
paraconsistent logic LP is of this kind. Another closely similar paraconsistent
alternative is the paraconsistent logic of Halldén (1949) (though Halldén em-
ploys “designated values” where we have spoken of “truth” and defines validity
in terms of “preservation of designated value”—on this account some contra-
dictions are “designated”).
2   
An obvious initial reason that has been offered for not pursuing any such para-
consistent approach to vagueness is simply that it is paraconsistent. On such
a view, paraconsistency per se is objectionable and so any theory that seeks to
apply such a logic is doomed from the outset. Keefe (2000: 197), for example,
speaking of subvaluationism suggests that:
many philosophers would soon discount the paraconsistent option
(almost) regardless of how successfully it treats vagueness, on the
grounds of the unappealing commitments and features of the logi-
cal framework as a whole, in particular the absurdity of A and ¬A
both being true for many instances of A.
Bearing in mind the foregoing distinction between paraconsistency and di-
alethic paraconsistency, the objection is properly aimed at the dialethic para-
consistentist given that it appeals to the supposed “absurdity ofA and ¬A both
being true for many instances of A”. Paraconsistency per se need make no such
commitment in its rejection of explosion. All that is required is the admis-
sion of theories that are non-trivial despite their inconsistency. The further
supposition that a theory of what is actually true is of this kind, and thus that
there actually are contradictory truths, is another matter. However, as already
noted, a paraconsistent account of vagueness is dialethic. Thus the objection
is properly targeted in this case.
Such an objection is frequently encountered and has been repeatedly dealt
with elsewhere (e.g. Priest 1987 and Sainsbury 1995, Ch. 6). While debate at
this very general level continues (see, most recently, Priest, Beall and Armour-
Garb 2004), we propose to set aside further discussion at this level and focus,
instead, on issues that arise with the particular application of paraconsistency
to vagueness and some of the problems that this might be thought to engender.
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3    
One such problem is that of knowledge of borderline cases. On standard ac-
counts of borderline cases in the sense relevant to vagueness, a borderline case
a for a predicate F is characterised as being an object to which the predicate F
meaningfully applies, yet which is such that we cannot know of a that it is F
nor that it is ¬F. Thus, for example, a reddish-yellow apple may be such that,
despite being a thing to which ‘red’ may be meaningfully applied, we cannot
know of it that it is red, nor can we know that it is not red. Its colour is such
that it falls on the borderline between the two colour categories red and yellow
and is neither clearly red nor clearly not red. The existence of borderline cases
is then typically taken as necessary for vagueness.
Epistemic theorists go on to explain this irremediable lack of knowledge
deemed necessary for vagueness by claiming that there is a fact of the matter,
a is F or ¬F, but we are precluded from knowing which predicate a satisfies
by a barrier to such knowledge arising from a margin-for-error principle gov-
erning inexact knowledge. (See Williamson 1994, Ch. 8.) Semantic theorists,
on the other hand, typically explain the lack of knowledge by claiming there is
simply nothing to be known in respect of which predicate a satisfies. The best
explanation of our lack of knowledge, they contend, is the absence of anything
to be known. We cannot know that the reddish-yellow apple is red nor that it
is not red simply because there is no fact of the matter either way, given the
semantic indeterminacy that attends our use of vague predicates like ‘red’.
So, for example, paracomplete accounts of vagueness are typified by their
claiming that it is neither true nor false that the apple is red and so neither
true that it is red nor true that it is not red, and it is this (rather than a barrier
to knowledge of what is the case) that underlies the inability to know. There is
simply no truth to be known either way.
Paraconsistent accounts, on the other hand, commit to truth both ways
(i.e. to truth and falsity), so might be thought to face an apparent difficulty
here. It is sometimes suggested that a paraconsistent approach to vagueness is
unable to accommodate the existence of borderline cases and so is unable to
acknowledge a necessary condition for vagueness. So much for a paraconsis-
tent account of vagueness then, so the argument goes.2
More exactly, the concern is as follows. The paraconsistentist will describe
the borderline case a for predicate F as satisfying both the predicate and its
negation. But if it is true that Fa and true that ¬Fa (since false that Fa) then
how can it be that we cannot know of a that it is F nor that it is ¬F? We might
postulate a barrier to knowledge of truth to explain our ignorance, appealing
to the same considerations postulated by epistemic theorists, but then we face
the theoretical burden incurred by an epistemic account of vagueness (which
semantic accounts seek to avoid) while also postulating a non-classical seman-
tic approach (which epistemic accounts seek to avoid). Theoretical parsimony
2The problem was first raised in conversation by Pablo Cobreros.
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speaks against such seemingly unnecessary complexity.
Alternatively, we might explain our ignorance by pointing to the fact that,
while true, the sentences Fa and ¬Fa are also false. This coupled with the sup-
position that one cannot know the false would suffice to rule out knowledge.
But such a supposition seems difficult to defend. While classically speaking
one cannot know the false, this is simply because the false is non-true and one
cannot know what is not true. In the situation to hand, truth obtains and
the paraconsistentist claims to know that it obtains (in addition to the truth
of its negation). Fa is true and so too ¬Fa, and in accepting a paraconsistent
approach to vagueness we take ourselves to come to know this.
Borderline cases then, on the paraconsistent account, are such that we can
know of them that they satisfy the vague predicate in question and also its
negation. The paraconsistentist should take issue with the characterisation of
“borderline cases” as described above. It simply begs the question against a
paraconsistent approach. What remains the case is that a borderline case a for
a vague predicate F is such that we cannot know of it that it is uniquely F (i.e.
that a satisfies F and does not satisfy ¬F) nor that it is uniquely ¬F (i.e. that
a satisfies ¬F and does not satisfy F). Of course, in consistent settings this is
equivalent to the simpler characterisation according to which we cannot know
of a that it is F nor that it is ¬F, but with the admission of a paraconsistent
approach to the range of theoretical responses to vagueness this simpler char-
acterisation rules out such an approach by definition and is therefore to be
abandoned in favour of the more general characterisation offered.
The situation faced by the paraconsistentist with respect to the character-
isation of borderline cases then resembles that encountered in the literature
earlier by epistemic theorists. Prior to the 1990s, many definitions of border-
line cases characterised them as cases where there was simply no answer to the
question whether the predicate in question applied or not. The manifest lack
of knowledge was conflated with the lack of anything to know. More recent
recognition of the need to avoid begging the question against an epistemic ac-
count has shifted discussions towards a more general characterisation that does
not prejudge the basis for what all can agree is, at least initially, an epistemic
gap. So too now with a paraconsistent account. Room must be made to allow
for its possibility so as to not rule out such an account by definition, and the
even more general characterisation offered above ought to be accepted.
4   
We might also wonder as to the assertibility or otherwise of Fa and ¬Fa where
a is a borderline case of F. After all, on the paraconsistent account Fa and ¬Fa
are both true and, in typical circumstances, this is known to obtain. If we are
to assert what we have good evidence for being true, we should then assert Fa
and ¬Fa. On the other hand, given a standard account of negation according to
which A is true if and only if ¬A is false and ¬A is true if and only if A is false,
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it follows that Fa and ¬Fa are both false, and, again, in typical circumstances,
this is known to obtain. Now, if we are to deny what we have good evidence for
being false, we should then deny Fa and ¬Fa. In such circumstances we seem
committed then to both asserting and denying both Fa and its negation. With
assertion and denial taken to express the mental states of acceptance and re-
jection respectively, if we follow the standard assumption that these states are
exclusive mental states with respect to any given sentence, then incoherence
ensues.
This is, in fact, an issue that is already familiar from the paraconsistency
literature.3 Incoherence is easily avoided in paraconsistent circumstances if we
simply reject the above assumption that we should deny what we have good
evidence for being false while retaining the idea that we should assert what
we have good evidence for being true. After all, in circumstances like the liar
paradox where a paraconsistent response has it that we have good evidence for
the acceptability of the conclusion (i.e. a sound argument for the conclusion),
we ought accept the conclusion despite its being false (as well as true). Its as-
sertion simply expresses this. As Sainsbury (1995: 140) points out, its rejection
would require subsequent rejection of some aspect of the reasoning which led
to it as conclusion and this would significantly detract from paraconsistency as
a response to the liar paradox. Though false, and evidently so, the paraconsis-
tentist ought not deny the conclusion. So too with borderline cases; though Fa
may be false it ought not be denied, since it is also true.
On this approach then, we ought only deny that which is evidently false and
not true. Of course, from a classical perspective this is simply tantamount to
the claim that we ought only deny the evidently false, and this is something the
classicist is already committed to. In paraconsistent circumstances, however,
the claims come apart and the exclusive nature of assertion and denial (and
acceptance and rejection) is restored by advocating the former principle.
The same threat of incoherence can be viewed from a different
perspective—one already familiar from discussions of paracomplete accounts
of vagueness. If denial of a sentence just is assertion of its negation, as com-
monly suggested, in denying Fa and its negation—as the paracomplete theorist
proposes with respect to borderline case predications—such an account would
then also be committed to asserting both the negation of Fa and ¬Fa. The
paracomplete theorist would then be required to both assert and deny each of
Fa and ¬Fa. The paracomplete theorist must abandon the idea that the denial
of a sentence A is equivalent to the assertion of ¬A. While the assertion of
¬A is sufficient for the denial of A, the denial of A is not sufficient for the
assertion of ¬A.
Analogously for the paraconsistentist: if denial of a sentence just is as-
sertion of its negation, in asserting ¬Fa—as proposed on the paraconsistent
account with respect to borderline case predications—such an account would
3See Priest (1986).
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then also be committed to denying Fa. And in also asserting ¬¬Fa (since equiv-
alent to the assertion of Fa) one would also thereby be committed to the denial
of ¬Fa. As before, we would then be committed to both asserting and denying
both Fa and its negation. As with paracomplete accounts, we should reject the
assumption that denial of a sentence is assertion of its negation. While the
denial of A is, from a paraconsistent perspective, sufficient for the assertion of
¬A, the assertion of ¬A is not sufficient for the denial of A.
Both paracomplete and paraconsistent accounts of vagueness must reject
the assumption that denial of a sentence is simply the assertion of its negation.
And it should be rejected for good reason: the assumption is not true. This
is already a familiar point in respect of paracomplete approaches, we can now
appreciate the corresponding point in respect of paraconsistent approaches.
In thus appreciating this in the paraconsistent case, we can now return to
our earlier problematic assumption that one ought deny the evidently false. In
a paraconsistent context, the following two assumptions are equivalent—the
(false) assumption that in asserting ¬A one is thereby committed to the denial
of A is equivalent to the (false) assumption that one ought deny the evidently
false.4 To see this, suppose that one is in a position to assert ¬A. Then one
must have evidence for the truth of ¬A, and so evidence for the falsity of A.5
And so, if we assume that one ought deny the evidently false, one ought deny
A. Conversely, suppose that A is evidently false. Then we have evidence for
the truth of ¬A and so ought be prepared to assert ¬A. And so, if we assume
that in asserting ¬A one is thereby committed to the denial of A, one ought
deny A. Given their equivalence then and the fact that the one assumption has
just been seen to be untrue, we can (as, indeed, we did earlier) and must reject
the other. Evidence of mere falsity is insufficient for denial.6
The paraconsistent account of vagueness faces no special difficulties in re-
4See Sainsbury (1995: 141–2).
5We are assuming that if a body of evidence E is evidence for B then it is evidence for any
claim equivalent to B.
6Given the revised conditions for rejection mooted above, one might wonder here whether
the paraconsistentist is yet entitled, by their own lights, to reject the problematic assumptions
under consideration concerning the relation between truth, falsity, negation, assertion and de-
nial. Rejection requires non-truth after all, and so the paraconsistentist must be careful to
establish more than the mere falsity of the assumptions in question. The query is a justified one
but we need have no concern here. The arguments above can be taken to establish non-truth,
as claimed. To be sure, the arguments against the problematic assumptions were reductio argu-
ments and at least some forms of reductio arguments are, by paraconsistent lights, insufficient to
establish the non-truth and subsequent rejection of an argument’s assumption. However, even by
paraconsistent lights reductio ad absurdum, as opposed to reductio ad contradictionem, offers a valid
reason to reject the assumption giving rise to the absurdity. After all, no-one wants to accept
an absurdity—where an absurdity is something unacceptable by your own lights. In the current
setting, however, contradictions are not always absurdities (in the required sense). In the argu-
ments in the main text, we have only relied on the paraconsistently-kosher reductio ad absurdum
to licence the rejection of the assumption in question. This, it seems, we are licensed to do.
(For more on this see Priest 1989.) We thank an anonymous referee for this line of defence of
our strategy.
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spect of assertion and denial.
5  
A weak commitment to paraconsistency involves a commitment to our being
able to reason non-trivially in the context of inconsistent theories. So, for ex-
ample, medieval philosophers reasoning hypothetically from the assumption
that God does not exist would, against a background where God’s existence
was taken to be necessary, be reasoning from an assumption that contradicted
this truth. We can, it seems, reason non-trivially in these and other similarly
inconsistent circumstances. The weak paraconsistentist advocates paraconsis-
tency to model such circumstances but there is no commitment to the truth
of the hypothetically considered situation.
A stronger commitment to paraconsistency involves, as we discussed ear-
lier, a commitment to the truth of some contradictions from which we might
non-trivially reason. In thus committing themselves to such a strong dialethic
account of vagueness one might wonder whether the strong paraconsistentist
thus commits to the inconsistency of the world thus described. Since the world
is manifestly not inconsistent, were the paraconsistentist thus committed, they
would be refuted by the falsity of this seemingly untoward consequence. Or, at
least, so it might be argued. What is the paraconsistent vagueness theorist to
say here?
Let us begin with the assumption that “the world is manifestly not inconsis-
tent”. Is this so obvious? Supposing we grant that the world is not manifestly
inconsistent, that objects that are borderline cases of ‘red’ (for example) are
not seen to be both red and not red. To infer from this that such objects are
not both red and not red would be a non sequitur on a par with supposing that
simply because we do not see the world as composed of atoms it follows that
it is not so composed. We may not see that the table in front of us is made up
of atoms (as postulated by physical theory) simply because we do not have the
physical theory to hand which gives an account of what we are in fact seeing.
Seeing the world for what it is—seeing it as composed of atoms, as governed
by particular physical laws, etc.—is a consequence of the theory-ladeness of
such “observations” coupled with the theories brought to the act of seeing. So
too with metaphysical theorising. We might see the borderline case of ‘red’
and it might also be the case that such a borderline case is both red and not
red, without it thereby following that we see the borderline case as red and not
red. Metaphysical theory can affect how we see the world as much as any other
theory, and much of the world’s nature can remain opaque without theory to
guide us (Beall and Colyvan 2001).
And this brings us to our second point. Is the paraconsistentist, in ac-
cepting a theory according to which our borderline case of ‘red’ is both red
and not red, really committed to the world being inconsistent (and their con-
sequently seeing it as such in light of their theoretical commitment)? The an-
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swer is clearly ‘no’. A commitment to a paraconsistent account of vagueness no
more requires a commitment to the world’s being inconsistent than a commit-
ment to a paracomplete account of vagueness requires a commitment to the
world’s being incomplete. Supervaluationism is a case in point. Most superval-
uationists are committed to our treating the indeterminacy due to vagueness
as a species of underdetermination or incompleteness of reference. This postu-
lated indeterminacy of reference, there simply being no fact of the matter as
to whether or not ‘red’ refers in such a way as to include our borderline case in
its extension or anti-extension, is deemed sufficient to explain the vagueness
of language. Paracomplete vagueness, on this view, amounts to nothing more
than semantic indeterminacy according to which what is represented by a given
vague term, e.g. ‘red’, is left open. There are many candidate referents no one
of which is determined. As McGee and McLaughlin put it, we learn “a disturb-
ing philosophical lesson” that the semantic approach to vagueness forces us to
accept “the inscrutability of reference” (2000: 130).
Similarly, the paraconsistentist can explain the indeterminacy due to vague-
ness as a species of overdetermination or inconsistency of reference. Paracon-
sistent vagueness, on this view, amounts to nothing more than semantic inde-
terminacy according to which what is represented by a given vague term, e.g.
‘red’, is not left open but is, rather, determined in a number of mutually incon-
sistent ways. There are many candidate referents no one of which is uniquely
determined. There is no requirement for a paraconsistent account of vagueness
to be committed to the idea that inconsistency in respect of the satisfaction
of a vague predicate by its borderline case is evidence of the inconsistency of
the instantiation of a vague property by that borderline case. Our semantics of
vagueness might admit of inconsistency without the world being thereby taken
as inconsistent.7
The general point here is a familiar one. Not all features of models rep-
resent features of that which is being modelled. As opposed to any particular
account of the vagueness of natural language, paracomplete or paraconsistent,
consider vagueness more generally. As Russell was keen to remind us, the mere
vagueness of natural language or any other system of representation is no sure
sign of the vagueness of that which is represented. In the case of natural lan-
guage, to overlook this is to commit what Russell (1923: 84–5) described as the
“fallacy of verbalism”:
There is a certain tendency in those who have realized that words
are vague to infer that things also are vague. . . This seems to me
precisely a case of the fallacy of verbalism—the fallacy that consists
in mistaking the properties of words for the properties of things.
7See Mares (2004) for more on the distinction between what he calls semantic dialetheism
and metaphysical dialetheism. Using Mares’ way of carving things up, the paraconsistentist need
only commit to semantic dialetheism and not to metaphysical dialetheism.
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Russell was in fact committed to the stronger claim that not only was such
an inference fallacious, there could be no sound argument for its conclusion
since its conclusion was false.
Vagueness and precision alike are characteristics which can only
belong to a representation, of which language is an example. They
have to do with the relation between a representation and that
which it represents. Apart from representation, whether cognitive
or mechanical, there can be no such thing as vagueness or preci-
sion; things are what they are, and there is an end of it.
Whether he was right about this or not is another matter.8 The point here
is simply the weaker one that one is not required to read the property of the
representation into that which is represented.
Of course, the general question of when it is legitimate to read features of
a model into that which is being modelled is a difficult one. We must simply
look to the feature in question and the arguments for and against its being a
feature of that being modelled. In the case of the paracomplete account of
vagueness as merely semantic, McGee and McLaughlin recognise what they
take to be a disturbing feature—“the inscrutability of reference”. Analogously
on the paraconsistent account that views vagueness as merely semantic, there
is a corresponding lesson that semantic vagueness forces us to accept what we
might term “the fecundity of reference”. If such a consequence is disturbing
enough, one might reject attempts to contain either the incompleteness or in-
consistency to the model alone, and decide instead that it is best seen as a
feature of the world. A merely semantic view of vagueness might be aban-
doned in favour of a view that sees the phenomenon as ultimately having a
metaphysical foundation. But such a commitment is not mandatory without
further argument.9
Moreover, as we have seen, even if such a commitment is made and the
incompleteness or inconsistency manifested by vague language is indeed taken
as evidence of the incompleteness or inconsistency of that which vague lan-
guage is taken to represent, e.g. the world, the initial concerns deriving from
the opacity of this postulated feature of the world is itself no barrier to such a
paraconsistent account of vagueness. For all that has been said so far, a para-
consistent account of vagueness encounters no particular metaphysical diffi-
culties.
What might further argument for an inconsistent world look like? It’s
worth pausing for a moment to answer this question, if for no other reason
but to get clear about how the more-modest, semantic account differs from an
account according to which the world itself is inconsistent. One very general
8See, for example, Colyvan (2001) and Hyde (2008).
9See Beall and Colyvan (2001) for a tentative stab at such an argument.
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way to argue that features of a model should be treated as faithfully represent-
ing the corresponding bits of the world, is via an indispensability argument: if
the model in question needs to posit some entity a with properties F and G
and no other theory forgoing reference to a, F and G does as well, then we
say that a, F and G are indispensable. Moreover, we ought to believe in the
existence of as and believe that they have the properties F and G attributed to
them in the relevant theory.10 In the case of vagueness, what we would require
would be that our best scientific theories required vague predicates (which, in
part, means that there’s no better theory that does not need to resort to such
predicates) and that our best theory of vagueness be a paraconsistent one.11
If we have all this, then there will be some object a with inconsistent prop-
erty instantiations—a will have both the vague property F and ¬F. We are not
here committing to this or any other arguments for metaphysical dialetheism;
we have claimed that further argument is required and we draw attention to
one way that further argument might proceed. But there are several ways a
semantic dialetheist can resist this further argument (e.g. by showing that the
inconsistent properties are not indispensable and can be explained by means
of fecundity of reference to consistent properties).
6  
Finally, we should be clear as to the kind of response paraconsistency presents
to vagueness and associated paradox, the sorites paradox. Paraconsistency is
frequently presented as a “bullet biting” response to the particular problem at
issue, a resigned acceptance of the seemingly unacceptable. So, for example,
when discussing paradoxes such as the liar, the paraconsistent response pro-
poses that one simply accept the contradictory conclusion engendered by the
paradox, and in this sense amounts to biting the bullet. It should be clear that
the paraconsistent approaches to vagueness under discussion here are not such
responses.
The signature paradox associated with vagueness, the sorites paradox,
presents us with arguments to the effect that, for a sorites-prone predicate
F, everything within F’s range of significance satisfies F if anything does and
nothing satisfies F if anything in its range does not. The paradox thus presents
a prima facie case for what Williamson has termed an “all-or-nothing” view of
sorites-prone predicates. All objects within F’s range satisfy F or none do. Some
theorists do indeed advocate biting this bullet. Unger (1979), for example, takes
typical examples of the paradox involving a negated atomic predicate ¬F to be
sound thus establishing that everything satisfies ¬F. And, assuming consis-
10See Colyvan (2001) for a general defence of such indispensability arguments, Colyvan
(2001) for an indispensability argument for metaphysical vagueness, Hyde (2008) for another
account of metaphysical vagueness, and Beall and Colyvan (2001) and Colyvan (2008) for in-
dispensability argumens for belief in inconsistent objects.
11And also that the indispensability argument can be suitably defended.
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tency, he consequently maintains that any sorites which begins from the as-
sumption that some object does satisfy F (thus by sorites reasoning apparently
establishing that all do) is unsound by virtue of an untrue premise. Atomic
predicates like F have no satisfiers. The disjunctive bullet is thus sometimes
chewed one way, and other times the other way. The sorites paradox is taken
to show yet another cost of adhering to classical logic and semantics.
Paraconsistentists, on the other hand, seek to avoid the untoward conclu-
sions of sorites reasoning rather than learning to accept them. Recall that para-
consistency is characterised by its ability to accept inconsistency in a theory
(e.g. a theory of vagueness according to which, for some a and vague predicate
F, both Fa and ¬Fa are accepted in the theory) without triviality, i.e. without
everything thereby being accepted in the theory. What we might term the
“strong triviality” of a theory, everything being true in the theory, is able to
be avoided despite the acceptance of contradiction. Quite obviously, a weaker
species of triviality, the truth in the theory of every sentence predicating a
negated atomic vague predicate of something, is also able to be avoided. Paracon-
sistent logic with its attendant rejection of explosion as a rule of inference no
more requires weak triviality of inconsistent theories than it does strong triv-
iality. And in its application to vagueness, it is advocated precisely to avoid
any such commitment to weak triviality of the kind endorsed, for example, by
Unger.
The sorites paradox presents a prima facie case for the seemingly unaccept-
able weak triviality of theories involving vague predicates and it is by limited
acceptance of contradiction that the paraconsistentist hopes to avoid such triv-
iality while also avoiding the stronger triviality that results from the acceptance
of contradiction per se. Finding the bullet of weak triviality too abhorrent to
bite they invite limited contradiction instead.
Although our purpose in this paper is to clear the way for paraconsistent
accounts in general, without entering the fray on which particular paraconsis-
tent approach is the best, it might be worth saying just a few words about how a
particular paraconsistent account of vagueness would look and why it need not
be seen as bullet biting. As we have already made clear, what all paraconsistent
approaches have in common is that they treat the borderline region of a vague
predicate as glutty, with both the predicate and its negation applying to ob-
jects in the borderline region. One way of fleshing out this basic suggestion is
a subvaluational semantics developing Jas´kowski (1948). (See Hyde 1997).12 Ac-
cording to this approach, we consider all the permissible precisifications of the
vague predicate in question and quantify over them in determining the truth,
falsity or otherwise of any sentence, atomic or complex—as with the familiar
supervaluationist approach—but unlike the supervaluationist approach we de-
fine truth in terms of true on at least one permissible precisification, rather than
12We have already mentioned another paraconsistent approach of Halldén (1949). More re-
cently, David Ripley (2008) has advocated LP as a logic of vagueness.
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in terms of all such precisifications.13 It is important to note that subvaluation-
ism is the formal dual of supervaluationism, so shares all the formal virtues as
well as vices of that approach. Any reason for choosing supervaluationism over
subvaluationism will need to appeal to non-formal (philosophical) features of
the accounts in question. It’s fair to say that thus far no such features have
been identified (Beall and Colyvan 2001; Hyde 2001).
The important point, for present purposes, is that subvaluationism is no
more a bullet-biting response than is supervaluationism. Indeed, there is some-
thing arbitrary about insisting—as supervaluationism does—on truth in terms
of all permissible precisifications. While truth in terms of at least one permis-
sible precisification is (for all that has been said so far) also arbitrary, it is not
some last resort one is pushed to for want of a better response. On the con-
trary, it is a very natural position and a natural response to the arbitrariness of
the dominant supervaluationist approach. And properly understood, it really
does seem on a par with supervaluationism, including the much touted conser-
vativism with respect to classical logic (Hyde 2008, Ch. 4).14
7 
Paraconsistent accounts of vagueness have been present in the literature for
as long as modern formal treatments of paraconsistency themselves and yet
they have attracted very little attention in the more recent explosion of lit-
erature on the subject of vagueness. Suspecting as-yet unarticulated concerns
that prohibit their acceptance, we have looked at a range of problems that
might be variously mooted as points of concern in respect of a paraconsistent
account. Having looked at these problems the paraconsistentist might face
when applying themselves to vagueness—problems to do with knowledge and
borderline cases, assertion and denial, concerns about incurring commitments
to an inconsistent world, or concerns arising from the kind of response offered
to the associated sorites paradox—we conclude that, at least on the grounds
considered here, the paraconsistentist is free to continue making their case.15
13An LP response, on the other hand, proceeds similarly with respect to atomic sentences but
evaluates complex sentences by means of the familiar LP truth-functions.
14The conservativism with respect to classical logic is typically cited by advocates of super-
valuationism as one of the strengths of the latter. But from where we sit, preserving classical
logic in the context of vagueness—where all the data is pointing away from classical logic—
hardly seems virtuous. Moreover, the paraconsistent deviation incurred by subvaluationism is
no greater than that incurred by the paracomplete supervaluationist response.
15We would like to thank members of a working group meeting on vagueness held at the
University of Sydney in 2007: James Chase, Graham Priest, Nick Smith, Roy Sorensen, and
Zach Weber. We are also indebted to an anonymous referee for several very helpful suggested
improvements on an earlier draft. Work on this paper was funded by an Australian Research
Council Discover Grant (grant number 0666020) awarded to the authors.
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